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Labour-Related Conventions and Configurations of 
Meaning: France, Germany and Great Britain prior to 
the Second World War 
Robert Salais ∗ 
Abstract: »Arbeitsbezogene Konventionen und Sinnkonfigurationen: Frank-
reich, Deutschland und Großbritannien vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg«. Using the 
economics of convention, this contribution aims at develop an approach capa-
ble of explaining the long-term national idiosyncrasies and describing them as 
stable configurations of meaning. One takes the example of labour in three 
European countries, France, Germany and Great-Britain, by focussing on the 
Interwar. Three interconnected objectives are pursued: theoretical (defining 
labour as activity of realisation); methodological (finding a historical narrative 
based on conventions and not on institutions); illustrative (shedding light on 
the deep specificities of the meanings of labour among the three countries). A 
red line runs along the paper, that of offering a coherent variety of arguments 
in favour of conventions-based history. It is stressed that in economic and so-
cial coordination conventions are prior to institutions. Social objects (in par-
ticular institutions) have to be analysed as sedimentations and rearrangements 
of conventions along history. In such a perspective, historical research would 
aim at bringing to light the buried traces of the configurations of meaning and 
of the systems of conventions which have durably installed these configura-
tions in daily life and work. And, in periods of crises, it should focus on the 
processes of change which bring about re-interpretation of the established con-
figurations, their reorganisation – often, at the end, more incremental than it 
appears at first glance – through the incorporation of new social objects and 
conventions. 
Keywords: conventions, institutional change, configuration of meaning, trace, 
labour history, employment relation, historical process. 
 
«Die Spur ist Erscheinung einer Nähe, so fern das sein mag, was sie 
hinterliess. Die Aura ist Erscheinung einer Ferne, so nah das sein 
mag, was sie hervorruft» (Walter Benjamin, Passagen-Werk 1983, 
560). 
The current problems facing the construction of Europe – the diverging paths 
of Member States and their difficulties to achieve true agreements – have once 
again brought to fore the idiosyncrasies of the countries comprising the EU. 
                                                             
∗  Address all communications to: Robert Salais, Institutions et dynamiques historiques de 
l’économie (IDHE), ENS-Cachan, 61 avenue du Président Wilson, 94235 Cachan Cedex, 
France; e-mail: robert.salais@ens-cachan.fr. 
 Translated by Susan Taponier. 
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These singular traits are rooted in national socio-historical trajectories, which 
are becoming increasingly evident in a number of areas, particularly labour. 
Using the economics of convention, the challenge we are addressing here is to 
develop an approach of labour capable of explaining the long-term national 
idiosyncrasies and describing them as stable configurations of meaning. We 
will argue that established systems of conventions are more stable and, in some 
way, more “efficient” to ensure coordination than institutions. Institutions 
require the mediation of conventions to be effective. Such properties come 
from the repeated actualisation of conventions in daily social practice, which 
forms the material from which people develop their practical knowledge; which 
means that, ultimately, these are conventions and their evolution, not institu-
tions that propel the socio-historical dynamic. Conventions work, not only as 
mutual expectations, but also as traces historically incorporated into social 
objects, and due to the variety of these objects they exercise stabilising forces 
on collective trajectories. This is not to say that change or innovation is impos-
sible, but its process is hard for institutional constructivism, as promoted by 
Europe, to understand and cope with1. 
Part 1 is theoretical: it proposes a definition of labour as process of realisa-
tion. In positing the hypothesis that action can be divided into two types of 
regimes, one pragmatic and the other constitutive-constructivist,2 we then aim 
to bring out the dynamic interaction between conventions (the pragmatic re-
gime) and institutions (the constitutive-constructivist regime) and suggest the 
socio-historical antecedence of conventions over institutions. A convention-
based socio-history is thus required, which raises questions about how one can 
gain empirical access to conventions and present national idiosyncrasies in a 
comparative framework. To meet these needs, in Part 1, we will introduce three 
concepts: “reality test” (central to the economics of convention), “configuration 
of meaning” and “trace”. The last two concepts have been freely developed 
from the debate within hermeneutics, along with an additional reference to 
Walter Benjamin. 
Part 2 lays the groundwork for the convention-based approach by develop-
ing a heuristic schema linking labour to its product, which can be used to or-
ganise empirical questioning. Labour activity as a process of realisation is 
made up of three moments: hiring (Moment 1), productive coordination (Mo-
ment 2), and the test of product’s reality – that is testing whether the product, 
when realised, confirms the various expectations with regards to its quality 
                                                             
1  The writing of this text has benefitted from earlier presentations and discussions in the 
methods seminar at the Centre Marc Bloch (21 June 2010), the IDHE seminar (11 January 
2011), and the first IEA-BIT Entretiens – Le sens du travail – on 31 March 2011 at the In-
stitut d’Etudes Avancées de Nantes. I would like to express special thanks to Denis 
Thouard, my colleague at the Centre Marc Bloch in Berlin, for initiating me to hermeneu-
tics. I am responsible for any mistakes or failure to understand.  
2  The use of this double attributive adjective is explained in Part 1. 
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(Moment 3). These three moments are dynamically linked and interact with 
each other. In every society, they are the subject of conventions of coordination 
and evaluation that leave behind traces (in Walter Benjamin’s sense of the 
term) in social artefacts, first and foremost institutions and their rules relating 
to the field of labour. 
Part 3 aims to illustrate in a few pages3 the rich possibilities of this theoreti-
cal and methodological framework that make it especially well suited to his-
torical narrative. It focuses on the conceptions of employment relations in three 
dominant countries – France, Germany and Great Britain – during the period 
prior to the Second World War. This period shaped the national foundations on 
which post-war Europe was to be built. Part 3 shows how each country, faced 
with the same challenge to grasp labour as a realisation process, gave rise to its 
own configuration of meaning regarding labour, which helped to give it a spe-
cific historical trajectory.  
We will conclude with two open questions. The first concerns the construc-
tion of Europe (our question at the outset), and the second how the hermeneutic 
approach can support a convention-based socio-history.  
1. Labour Activity and the Convention-Based Approach 
Our contribution starts from a conception of labour as a social activity essen-
tially aimed at realising a product, a service or any other “object” (in a general 
sense).4 In the following section, we will be using the convention-based ap-
proach to develop this conception. 
1.1 Labour, Realisation Process and Product 
The theoretical developments undertaken here are based on four guidelines. 
First, whenever and wherever labour activity is carried out it creates “ob-
jects” that did not exist prior to their realisation. It is thus the ongoing source of 
a new reality, which means that, in the realisation process, it posits the sur-
rounding world as incomplete. The creation of reality inherent in labour activ-
ity – in short its Promethean dimension – expresses the irreducibility of human 
freedom. Every labour process consists in coordinating individuals, in other 
words human beings whose ontological status is that of individual free wills. 
As a result, coordination takes place in a context of overall uncertainty about 
the future, about what others are doing and will do, and about the ability of 
existing labour arrangements (their rules and objects) to achieve the targeted 
results. Labour must therefore be analysed as the “situated” expression of hu-
                                                             
3  Coming from a wider research project currently under way. 
4  Cf. also Salais (1998). 
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man freedom, and the constraints brought to bear upon it, no matter how 
strong, must be analysed relative to that freedom.  
Second, starting from these two characteristics (the situated expression of 
freedom and the context of overall uncertainty), the participants in the process 
are using conventions for coordination to begin and proceed. In labour as in 
any other activity, conventions allow each person to assume that he or she is 
engaging in a common world, a world shared with others. This common world 
is neither closed nor pre-existing; it is a possible world and consequently opens 
onto the future. Under these conditions, coordination can then move forward 
based on mutual expectations. Conventions are therefore not only assumptions 
about the action to be performed but also a frame of reference to evaluate what 
happens in the course of coordination and to allow it go further. 
Third – and this applies to all areas of life – conventions have both cognitive 
and normative aspects. Conventions tell the participants what is happening in 
the coordination process. They also remind the participants what is expected of 
them. They are therefore cognitive and normative in the practical sense that 
they are derived from personal experience acquired individually through social 
interaction. These cognitive and normative aspects do not stem from applying 
general categories from outside the participants’ experience, which they then 
interiorise as a categorical imperative. To be sure, by their very nature, institu-
tions carry such general categories within them, and therefore we cannot ignore 
them when we are dealing with institutions. But when we act, we reinterpret 
those general categories through the mediation of our “conventional” construc-
tion of the world. Interpretation and mediation are at the core of the complexi-
ties between conventions and institutions. In reality, they cannot be thought or 
developed independently of each other. One must nevertheless examine both if 
one wishes to arrive at a genuine understanding of social processes.  
Fourth, for the participants, the success or failure of coordination is verified, 
practically speaking, upon its completion; that is the moment when the reality 
test evaluates what has taken place. One of the essential peculiarities of labour 
activity is that the reality test pertains not to the labour itself but to the product 
of that labour. Because labour is a process of realisation, the ultimate test of its 
reality lies outside itself. This is true regardless of the society in question or its 
economic system. But a much broader conception of the test is required than 
the one developed by the theoreticians and practitioners of the scientific or-
ganisation of work who have gradually colonised the sciences of work since the 
1970s and 1980s.5 In the context of the so-called “scientific” work organisation 
they imposed the idea that the reality test was limited to measuring efficiency 
or comparing the production process with predetermined quality norms and 
standards. From a strictly economic standpoint, the apparent autonomy granted 
                                                             
5  France offers a particularly significant example of such a reduction in labour economics 
(Salais 1994). Axel Honneth (1980) analysed the same reduction in the sociology of labour.  
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to the field of organisation should not obscure the fact that labour is ultimately 
intended to put a concrete product to users (whatever they are). In a general 
market economy, the final test of labour takes place in the market for its prod-
uct; in an economy of exchange between persons, the product user determines 
the test result; in a planned economy, the quality and quantity standards set for 
the product by the plan are the basis for the test. In a capitalist economy (which 
is merely one system among others), the employer expects the test to result in a 
return on his investment, according to the norms established in competition.  
More fundamentally, the finalities and values that products bring into play 
are much broader. The question of why or for whom one produces involves the 
basic objectives of society. Is it for the company’s profit? To give everyone 
access to all the basic capacities? To improve the well-being of the commu-
nity? To foster sustainable development? Clearly, there is no single convention 
for evaluating labour. All these issues could be the source of conflicts and 
unstable compromises between different evaluation conventions. The scope of 
the area to be evaluated, how open or closed it is, how it is structured and how 
the different moments are related to each other, the breakdown of responsibility 
among the participants and the conception of all these aspects are essential 
issues in such conflicts, which are both normative and cognitive. The diversity 
of national idiosyncrasies and their historical development stem from the plu-
rality of possible solutions. 
1.2 The Socio-Historical Antecedence of Conventions 
Over Institutions 
From the practical standpoint of persons, the preceding orientations imply that 
conventions are prior to institutions. One way or another, the latter are an out-
growth of the former, which argues in favour of a socio-history of conventions. 
This is not to say that conventions have ontological antecedence over institu-
tions. Their antecedence does not result from a dogmatic determination of what 
must be a priori, or from the intervention of a deus ex machina such as the 
laws of history or of evolution. It is socio-historical. We will not attempt here 
to settle the question as to whether the same socio-historical antecedence holds 
in all social spheres, though one could be inclined to think it does, inasmuch as 
labour activity sheds light on what can be considered the general characteristics 
of any action. 
Our arguments differentiate between two regimes of action: a pragmatic re-
gime and a constitutive-constructivist regime. The first involves practical ex-
perience, which every person acquires and uses in daily life; the second in-
volves general knowledge and the use of theoretical justifications. Conventions 
belong to the pragmatic regime, whereas institutions belong to the constitutive-
constructivist regime. The pragmatic regime comes first in the sense that it is 
impossible to engage in social coordination without making use of conventions. 
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The constructivist regime comes second6 insofar as its constructions (institu-
tions and their rules) must somehow correspond to conventions in order to 
become “real”, in other words, to be effectively at work in coordination. For 
institutions and their rules to have an effect, they must be mediated by conven-
tions and by their evaluation and reference models. At some point, as the out-
comes of repeated deliberations and testing, institutions and rules become 
established as sedimentations of conventions or as compromises between them. 
In an ordinary regime, conventions belong to what individuals in action as-
sume – without even thinking about it – to be the basis and fundamental given 
of the action. Like all conventions, labour conventions are part of the elemen-
tary, autonomous repertory of actions and knowledge that ensure us a role in 
the collective in which we are involved: we act then and there as others expect 
us to act or, if not, we give signs or justifications to explain why our actions do 
not conform to those expectations. Pragmatically, conventions are therefore 
prior to institutions. We do not need to marshal the whole institutional arsenal 
to buy bread at the bakery. Similarly, to know what we have to do at a given 
moment in our job, we do not have to consult a whole battery of regulations 
and laws defining the job and its specific tasks before taking action.  
A socio-history through institutions, particularly when it is underpinned by 
the theory of rational choices or by neo-institutional economics (like the ap-
proaches of Williamson or North), will seek out the driving force of the dy-
namic above all in the rational, constructivist activity of the agents, in their 
ongoing effort to modify or negotiate the institutional framework in favour of 
their interests. So doing it neglects the basic role of conventions in ensuring the 
effectiveness of institutions. This constructivist itch, generally encountered in 
the political sphere, must of course be taken as material for the history we are 
attempting to do and as an important factor in that history. Furthermore view-
ing constructivist activity as the sole driving force of history would also mean 
neglecting the constitutive dimension of institutions, i.e. their justification 
based on fundamental principles (see below).  
To have an effect on and in society, we believe, instead, that new institu-
tions or adjustments of existing ones must undergo the test of conventions, of 
their framework of interpretation and action. There are countless historical 
examples of the capacity of conventional systems to last over the long term, 
sometimes at the cost of renewed advocacy and justifications; or to resurface 
more or less unchanged as a resource suitable for everyday coordination after 
fading out, sometimes for several generations. These conventional systems do 
not have an immutable essence, but rather long-term stability arising from their 
continuous actualisation in daily social practice, which forms the material from 
                                                             
6  Here second in no way means “secondary”, i.e. less important or of lower status. We could 
just as easily say that conventions and institutions exist as parts of a reciprocally encom-
passing whole.  
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which we develop our practical knowledge. What governs the appearance, 
development, transformation and decline of conventions is at once the driving 
force and the fruit of social and historical processes. But these processes have 
one particular – and essential – feature: they are neither intentional nor rational 
in the usual sense of the term.7 In their dynamics conventions and institutions 
interact, which is why, as we shall argue later on, it is possible to find traces of 
conventions embedded in the “material” of social artefacts, particularly institu-
tions and their rules and uses.  
Let us develop this further. Institutions are situated at a level of social coor-
dination, which in our approach corresponds to the state and to the establish-
ment of constitutive rules that express the legal and ethical principles used as 
frame of reference for community life. Consequently, the social dynamic in-
volves complex interactions between institutions (which inscribe more general 
principles of evaluation in the sphere of conventions) and conventions (which 
are a constant reminder that institutions can acquire legitimacy and effective-
ness only by meeting people’s convention-based expectations). Finally, with 
regard to labour, we cannot ignore the paradigm of organisation or the com-
plex, conflicting relationship that arises between coordination through conven-
tions and organisation. Indeed, organisation develops rules that are no longer 
constitutive but merely regulative. Regulative rules are means that are ration-
ally optimised to achieve pre-established ends. In organisation, the realisation 
involved in labour is no longer an expression of human freedom transcending 
instrumental aims; it is reduced to the rational imposition of a quantitative 
performance. Thus, if we want to take the implications of the convention-based 
approach to labour to their logical conclusion, today we are forced to manoeu-
vre theoretically within a system of political influences and blurring between 
convention, institution and organisation (Salais 2009). The current crisis has 
revealed an invasion of the area of institutions by a logic of organisation and 
instrumental rationality; regulative rules have been raised to the level of consti-
tutive rules, usurping and degrading their status. That is why we have to qualify 
institutions as a mixed regime – both constitutive and constructivist – in which 
the weight of each side may vary. 
                                                             
7  It is also very difficult to apply a genetic conception to conventions. Inasmuch as every 
person can find (and adapt if necessary) a convention that allows him or her to enter into 
coordination, convention-based history is like a process with no beginning or end. This 
conception can be derived from the research of David Lewis (1969); see also Salais (1993).  
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1.3 Towards a Convention-Based Socio-History of Labour: 
Why and How  
We must therefore undertake a socio-history of labour through conventions.  
As researchers, whatever our approach, we are facing a series of challenges. 
First, people or actors never conform their behaviour to the general categories 
or models developed by academic research: they are simply elsewhere. Any 
systematic theorisation, when applied, will meet situations, people, periods in 
which it is in serious default. Second, people or actors never cut into separate 
pieces or segments (the economic, the social, the political, etc.) their activities 
as academicians do. Thirdly, as conventions are inseparable from the actions 
that actualise them in situ, it seems they cannot be observed. Fourthly, as mak-
ers of economic, political and social theories, our constructions contribute, at 
least for some and sometimes, to “perform” the economy and the society: they 
could become ingredients for conventions used by actors. 
How could the economics of convention try to cope with such challenges? 
By taking seriously as its core concern this intimate link made by and in con-
ventions between practical knowledge of actors, their interpretation, their ac-
tion and their evaluation of situations. 
We will first make a short detour (which we hope will not be simplistic) to 
point out remote roots of the approach in the Hegelian concept of objective 
mind, which subsequently developed around labour and in hermeneutics, and 
introduce the concept of configuration of meaning. We will then introduce the 
concept of traces and consider social objects (especially institutions) as “ques-
tionings”.  
1.3.1 Hermeneutics and Labour: Facing the Object 
Labour stands opposite its product: what is their reciprocal relationship? This is 
our starting point. And this is how Hegel reinterpreted the concept of labour he 
found in English political economy (Lukacs 1948), which actually conceived of 
it quite differently, as we shall see in Part 3. On the other hand, we shall also 
see in Part 3 that, in the long run, Hegel influenced the way the concept of 
labour was understood in Germany. But this problem – the objective character 
of the object, which requires going beyond the idea of an immediate inter-
subjective understanding of meaning – is also that of hermeneutics. The inter-
preter, the user, the subject of an institution, the actor are faced with an object 
that has acquired a consistency of its own as well as autonomy in relation to the 
original situation (Thouard 2008). This also holds true for the product of la-
bour. The product emanates from labour as an extension of human activity and 
intentions (conceived by Hegel as the realisation-exteriorisation of the objec-
tive mind) but, as soon as realised, escapes to them.  
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The relation between labour and its product has long been the subject of his-
torical debate. Honneth, in a 1980 text, recalls that in the philosophy of labour, 
the term “labour” designated not only the social practice by which the world is 
built but also the level at which potential knowledge emerged capable of mak-
ing a process of expanding social freedom possible. Marx specifically sought to 
understand labour not only in terms of economic growth, but also and above all 
from the standpoint of the practical and normative finalities of emancipatory 
development.8 From this point of view, the stakes of the interpretation of labour 
as activity have links to those of hermeneutics (an approach that inspired au-
thors like Lukacs and Benjamin). Hegel conceived of labour as a constitutive 
moment in self-consciousness. He (and Marx in his early works) thought that 
the product of labour had, to use Honneth’s term, a “retroactive” signification 
for the working subject, because labour activity could be characterised as a 
process of concretising one’s cognitive capacities. Labour accompanied by 
awareness and reflexivity could become the medium for potential development 
and emancipation.  
In Honneth’s view, Marx’s failure in his later works was to settle for an in-
strumental conception of labour, according to which capitalism of itself did “all 
the work” of transforming labour into a process of emancipation: by develop-
ing productive forces, imposing the apprenticeship of discipline and productiv-
ity at work and centralising workers into organised masses within large firms. 
This view reduced the conception of labour to instrumental performance and 
simultaneously and subsequently dismantled the emancipatory theoretical 
status of labour. Hannah Arendt (for whom “true action is free from all contact 
with things”9) and Jürgen Habermas10 (who limited labour to its instrumental 
role) contributed significantly to this disenchantment. As Honneth notes, 
Habermas did not realise that he had within his reach a model of interpretation 
of labour as coordination and inter-subjective comprehension in the workplace. 
This would have allowed him to see the practical rationality and the efforts of 
appropriation that workers developed in situ in their work, which has been 
revealed by numerous studies.11 Labour activity, past and present, cannot be 
reduced to applying the rules of an organisation, however perfect. It is the 
source of knowledge about work. It is still an open question whether, given the 
conditions of the transformations of work today, this knowledge can be 
enlarged into an operative social critique and participate in defining an emanci-
patory process, and if so, which one. 
                                                             
8  In his 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. 
9  Honneth (1980, 38). 
10  Arendt (1960); Habermas (1979). 
11  Philippe Bernoux (1979) and Robert Linhart (1978), cited by Axel Honneth, but also, much 
more recently and with other theoretical backgrounds Nicolas Dodier (1995), Alain Supiot 
(1995), Isabelle Ferreras (2007) and Bénédicte Zimmermann (2011), to mention only a few.  
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The basic assumption of hermeneutics is that every social object12, among 
the many “expressions of life” (Dilthey 1910) in the vast collection of gestures, 
spoken words, tools, works of art and institutions, is the product of an activity 
and that activity has left traces. These traces of other times and places do not 
simply yield themselves to actors here and now. A trace is not simply a deposit 
in an external reality of the ends, values and significations of those who pro-
duced the object in an earlier time and place. It is, to interpret the concept used 
by Heinrich Rickert and also by Hans Freyer (1922), a configuration of mean-
ing13 incorporated in the object. As Georg Simmel emphasises in The Philoso-
phy of Money14, the configuration of meaning that actors call upon in the pro-
cess of coordination has already accumulated over the course of time 
sedimented layers of interpretation, appropriation and transformation that have 
made it opaque to the very persons who rely on it. Even more, this configura-
tion of meaning is inscribed and distributed (we would say today) in “social 
forms, institutions, customs, habits, aesthetic, gestural and linguistic codes”15 
(in other words, conventions that form a system), which produce significations 
“behind the backs” of the actors. It has become a heritage, as it were, which can 
still be actively appropriated, but only partially. Moreover, we might add, the 
contemporary development of purely instrumental rationality has helped to turn 
the social sphere into a playing field for strategy games among actors. Configu-
rations of meaning – if not the intentions, at least the underlying orientations16 
that objects have acquired in the course of their historical trajectories – have 
been covered up by overdetermination in terms of competing interests, which 
have replaced the former as the driving forces of action.  
From the “genesis” – if there is one – of a configuration of meaning over 
time these accumulations and sedimentations concentrate into a sort of reper-
tory from which each actor, here and now, can draw the practical and strategic 
meaning of the events under way, the situation and the actions of others. Such 
stabilised repertory allows actors to reach agreement, debate, oppose each 
other, sometimes even violently, based on a common yet unquestioned back-
ground. The stability of the system is due in large part to the fact that all can 
easily check to see that it works, that the others act as anticipated or simply 
give the expected signals. To what extent does such system leave room for 
interpretation and innovation? Only a historical approach that is always “retro-
spective” can answer that question. For it is in the nature of a shift in trajectory, 
                                                             
12  Later on we will speak of social artefacts to underscore the fact that they are social  
products. 
13  We are borrowing the concept of “configuration of meaning” from the French translation of 
Rickert, Les problèmes de la philosophie de l’histoire, pages 105-117. 
14  Simmel (1907); cf. also his reflections on history in Simmel (1918).  
15  Thouard (2008, 13). 
16  Or “intentionability”, a neologism suggested by Denis Thouard.  
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a change of course or an innovation to be recognised as such by actors only 
well after the fact through a collective effort to reconstruct its meaning.  
Philosophy of labour as well as the area of hermeneutics focused on inter-
subjective relationships hoped to cut through the opacity of the social reality 
and recover the initial transparency of its origin. The former expected that the 
return to full knowledge would bring with it social emancipation, conscious of 
itself and capable of finding its way and not deviating from it; the latter hoped 
it would yield a historical approach capable of breaking through the barrier of 
time and bringing the past and the present together in full inter-comprehension.  
1.3.2 In Search of Configurations of Meaning: Traces and Questionings 
What the economics of convention can undertake is more modest and, one 
guesses, more realistic. Following the example of Simmel, it can make the 
opacity more decipherable and practicable. The task should be first to become 
aware of the configurations of meaning that have laden social objects with 
semantic determinations, knowledge, experiences and practices, and second, to 
be able to grasp the plurality of interpretations of social reality and the plurality 
of possible worlds this reality harbours. In such a perspective, historical re-
search would aim at bringing to light the buried traces of the configurations of 
meaning and of the systems of conventions which have durably installed these 
configurations in daily life and work. And, in periods of crises, it should focus, 
by difference, on the processes which bring about re-interpretation of the estab-
lished configurations, their reorganisation – often, at the end, more incremental 
than it appears at first glance – through the incorporation of new social objects 
and conventions. 
Yet, paradoxically, conventions are inseparable from the actions that actual-
ise them in situ, and therefore cannot be observed, except in special circum-
stances.  
Under these conditions, researchers have to be wily. There are basically 
three methods available to them: they can conduct participatory inquiry; they 
can observe crisis situations that force the actors to produce justifications for 
their actions; or, borrowing from detective stories and, in a more serious vein, 
from Walter Benjamin and hermeneutics, they can look for converging 
clues, the “traces” that conventions leave behind in the collective artefacts 
developed through their use.  
In The Arcades Project (1999), Walter Benjamin gives us the following 
definition: “The trace is the appearance of nearness, however far removed the 
thing that left it behind may be”. He contrasts it with the aura: “The aura is the 
appearance of a distance, however close the thing that calls it forth”. When 
transposed to a conception of social artefacts as systems of sedimented conven-
tions, Benjamin’s concepts suggest a dialectic between conventions and institu-
tions analogous to that between the near and the distant. This co-presence of 
the near and the distant in the object, emphasised by Benjamin, is certainly one 
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of the main factors ensuring the stability of configurations of meaning over 
time.  
Provided we know what we are looking for and how to look for it, the land-
scape around us –Walter Benjamin’s Paris arcades, for example – yields traces 
of conventions and more broadly of the configurations of meaning conventions 
have embedded in it. When we look at our surroundings, if the traces converge 
with each successive gaze, then we have grasped something in the nature of a 
proof. 
The list of social artefacts in the landscape of labour is a priori a long one. It 
comprises theoretical writings on economics and society; statistics; labour law 
and more generally if possible, economic law; systems of collective bargaining; 
institutions related to social issues; the organisation of work, production and 
the market; quality standards governing labour and products, or even technical 
objects (the material form of these objects incorporates expectations about their 
efficient use, in other words implicitly exhibits a cognitive model of “good” 
work), or ordinary world-views as expressed in actors’ material.  
In short, these artefacts “observe” labour in order to evaluate it and act upon 
it. They are constructed as ways of problematising, or better yet, of “question-
ing” labour. As questionings with an operative aim, these social objects define, 
describe, classify and rank. They operate through the use of justifying theories, 
inquiries, survey procedures, data creation and measuring methods, all of 
which are conventional instruments that intend to grasp and to evaluate labour 
practices and therefore the conventions at work in labour coordination. In other 
words, the traces those conventional instruments have left in social objects are 
those of questionings. In a socio-history of labour through conventions, these 
are those questionings that must be questioned. One can discover there the 
material from which configurations of meaning come and take generality.  
For example, let us take the institution of labour law. In this case, the role of 
the law is not to coordinate in place of individuals (as most forms of institu-
tionalism maintain). Rather, they serve to guarantee that, in the event of a prob-
lem or hazard due to conflicting interpretations of conventions or the use of 
different kinds of conventions by the participants, the problem or the conse-
quences of the hazard will be handled fairly. This implies that the participants 
have rights, identities, access to resources and forms of recognition by institu-
tions, all of which are materials that the researcher can examine for traces of 
the conventions that gave rise to them. This in turn implies that the rules of law 
have been built up by questioning the situation of coordination. This question-
ing constructs the legitimate characteristics of the situation, those that justify 
action taken by the community in the name of its fundamental objectives and 
values (we are thinking, for example, of the category of “unemployment”, the 
definition of the labour contract, the model of the employment relation embed-
ded in a collective agreement).  
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To uncover configurations of meaning, we must build a historical narrative 
based on a framework that allows us to understand the questionings incorpo-
rated in social objects. The narrative must be capable of revealing the traces 
sought in materials that may, at first glance, seem remote from each other. In 
making comparisons between countries and/or historical periods, it must em-
ploy the same framework. But unlike the usual approaches to international 
comparison, it must not only bring to the fore similarities and differences, but 
also and fundamentally the outstanding singularities of each one and how they 
came about. It requires to construct a heuristic (rather than a model in the strict 
sense) open to the diversity of conventions that “encode” and qualify the vari-
ous dimensions of the employment relation. The researcher should make effort 
not to use an a priori general theorisation, but to become aware of the ways 
people or actors practise.  
2. The Pattern for the Historical Narrative: 
Labour Conventions and Realised Product 
The pattern we will be using links labour conventions to the realised product. A 
product differs from the “commodities” of classical economics and from the 
“goods” of standard economics in that its essential characteristic – which is 
precisely that it is produced – is the very foundation of the concept. The prod-
uct cannot be separated from the productive coordination that ensures its reali-
sation or from the labour performed to make it and its conventions. Recipro-
cally, the labour conventions that are used cannot be separated from the 
concrete product they aim to realise.17 
2.1 The Pattern and Its Heuristic 
Figure 1 lists all the dimensions that make up the employment relation; it pre-
sents them in their order of appearance in the course of labour activity, and its 
engagement in the reality test on the product; it elucidates the chain of expecta-
tions going back and for through the process from product testing to the start of 
work. 
The pattern distinguishes three moments of the employment and shows how 
they are connected. Moment 1 refers to the establishment of an employment 
relation, when a wage is proposed in exchange for future labour activity (in 
other words, the moment of hiring). In Moment 2, the product is being made; it 
takes time and proceeds according to a certain arrangement of tools, rules and 
                                                             
17  Part 2 is based on the article on labour conventions published in the March 1989 issue of 
Revue économique (Salais 1989), which laid the groundwork for the economics of conven-
tion, and on a book written jointly with Michael Storper, Les mondes de production (Salais 
and Storper 1993; English version: Storper and Salais 1997). 
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persons. This is the moment when a use value and an exchange value are si-
multaneously created and results in the payment of wages. Moment 3 involves 
testing the reality of the engagements that were made; it is the moment when 
the expected values are (or are not) realised. This moment takes place in the 
product market, where the price and utility of the product are (or are not) vali-
dated to a certain degree by the demand for it.  
Figure 1: The Interrelation Between Labour and its Product 
 
 
In the case of labour, economic theory usually stops at Moment 1 (establishing 
the relation); it may sometimes include Moment 2 (productive coordination, 
work organisation), but it seldom refers to Moment 3 (the test of the product in 
its market), and above all never focuses on the interdependence among these 
moments. Yet the interdependence of the three Moments is fundamental to any 
understanding of labour activity. On the one hand, these moments are sequen-
tial; each one depends on the preceding ones. If the organisation of work is 
faulty (or if the hired workers do not have the necessary skills), the product that 
is realised will not meet expected quality standards or output level and there-
fore will not find buyers. On the other hand, as we tend to forget, the flow of 
time has two arrows, one moving downstream, and the other upstream. As 
labour activity proceeds (downstream time), it is constantly taking into account 
the degree to which its final aim has been realised; the course of the action is 
continually adjusted according to anticipations of what remains to be done 
(upstream time). The adjustment between realisation and anticipations takes 
place at every point and every moment as the work is accomplished, which 
explains the omnipresence of conventions that make it possible to evaluate how 
close the process is to completion and adjust to any gaps that appear.  
That figure makes perceptible the tensions and contradictions that arise be-
tween the actors in the employment relation, particularly those between the 
rules of the organisation (which are means used by the employer to achieve 
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predetermined ends) and the labour conventions (which express ends that po-
tentially transcend the mere instrumental aim). As it is, in restricting the test of 
the product to its market, figure 1 eliminates more general tests pertaining to 
the choice of products, the debate over their social purpose, the direction of 
society’s development and macroeconomic intervention by the state. However, 
this schema roughly applies to the interwar period, but should be broadened for 
the period after the Second World War. 
There are good reasons for postulating a certain similarity in the conceptu-
alisations of actors in the same country, above and beyond their particular field, 
if only because they observe and live in the same society and they have to take 
the constructs of others into account in their social interaction, which also leads 
to the emergence of a configuration of meaning. On the other hand, as we shall 
see, there is no reason why these conceptualisations should be the same in 
every country or every period. They become socio-historically dependent on 
specific national trajectories. 
 
Encart: Labour as Activity and Market Theory 
Let us examine the schema more closely to explain why labour as activity 
cannot be subsumed under a market theory (whether the market operates 
perfectly or not). Once the employment relation is established between the 
employer and the employee, it cannot be reduced to a spot exchange, nor 
can it ensure optimum adjustment to individual preferences. The reality of 
the commitments made on both sides (wages and working conditions on 
the one hand, effort and quality of labour on the other) remains uncertain. 
They have yet to be fulfilled in the course of the relation. The employment 
relation thus opens onto reciprocal testing, which can only be settled when 
the product has been realised and sold in the market. Labour activity and its 
concrete product are mutually dependent. Labour activity is thus thor-
oughly conventional in the sense that, in a context of uncertainty – about 
the future, about what the others are doing, about the ability of the existing 
labour arrangement to achieve the desired results – coordination can only 
proceed on the basis of mutual expectations, by assuming a common world. 
If there is a market in this process, it is the product market and not that of a 
factor called “labour”. But, you might rejoin, what about wages, aren’t they 
determined in a market – in the labour market as a matter of fact – where 
job seekers compete for job offers? In practice, wages are set in Moment 1 
in relation to the references used in a negotiation taking place at a particu-
lar time and place. These references include the wage schedule already 
practiced by the firm, wage scales for similar labour in the industry or lo-
cality, the collective agreement for workers in the industry, a company 
agreement, etc. The “labour market” is made up solely of a set of local 
matchings between, moreover, the promises exchanged by the parties with 
respect to the future of their relation. The real issue in Moment 1 is to de-
termine which references will be used in the matching and their possible 
connections to the subsequent moments, which emphasises collective bar-
gaining between employers and trade unions more than the market. 
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3. Three Specific Configurations of Meaning for the 
Employment Relationship 
In Part 3, we will be using the method of converging traces presented in Part 1. 
We have not tried to determine whether there is a hierarchy among the traces 
depending on the places and the social objects in which we are looking for 
them. Instead, we have examined economic theory, legal doctrine, jurispru-
dence and collective bargaining, along with what can be known about the “or-
dinary” understanding of the economic and social actors – employers, crafts-
men and trade unions – with regard to labour and how it was practised. For the 
most part, our approach involves reading existing research in the light of the 
pattern developed in Part 2 and Schema 1. It does not cover the entire field of 
conceivable investigation, but rather focuses on areas that can be reasonably 
considered important. We have then freely presented the narrative, country by 
country. The thread of that narrative differs from one country to the next, even 
though the same areas are discussed. We might say the narrative unfolded of 
itself, simply by following the different turns, focal points, hierarchies, ne-
glected aspects and biases specific to each country. 
Despite its limits, the exercise ends up consolidating to a large extent the 
hypothesis of a national configuration of meaning with respect to labour for the 
three countries (Germany, France and Great Britain) and the period under con-
sideration (roughly the interwar years). From the same basic elements, these 
configurations created their own specific arrangements across the places and 
objects studied. As we observe in research currently under way (which we have 
not discussed here), these configurations of meaning were superimposed on the 
variety of labour conventions at work in the socioeconomic fabric of each 
country through a process of selection and orientation. During the interwar 
period, for example, they channelled and narrowly specified the paths and 
methods for rationalising labour in each country. 
Figure 1 proves fruitful in the distinction it proposes between the three mo-
ments of the employment relation and its emphasis on their interconnection. 
We will begin with Great Britain and Germany, which were, in opposite ways, 
the farthest removed from the liberal contract model, whereas France was, on 
the contrary, closest to it. This assertion may seem surprising, as Great Britain 
has come to be commonly – though wrongly – viewed as the paradigm of the 
liberal model. In reality, the codification of the employment relation in Great 
Britain was not an outgrowth of freedom of contract, but rather of the relation 
of dependence of servants on their masters (the service contract). In Germany, 
it emerged not from freedom of contract but from freedom of association. To 
describe these differences adequately, we shall see that in Great Britain the 
process took place over a long, stationary period (beginning in the middle of 
the nineteenth century or even earlier), whereas in Germany it developed in a 
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short, even very short, chaotic period (from 1919 and the creation of the Wei-
mar Republic), and in France at a slow rhythm marked by sudden accelerations. 
3.1 Great Britain and the Servant’s Dependence on the Master 
The conventions that laid the groundwork for the employment relation in Great 
Britain were the highly improbable result of the intersection between diverse 
and even contradictory factors over the long term. The only thing these factors 
had in common was their focus on the product, but on the product made and 
brought to market (rather than the product yet to be made as in Germany).  
In the British configuration of meaning, the employer was positioned above 
all as the recipient and seller of the product. He was limited to being the inter-
mediary of the market. He passed along the market’s wishes to the workshops 
and production, which he had only a marginal interest in organising. He de-
rived his profit mainly from the sale of the product. Moment 3 (the product 
market) was therefore the dominant moment, or rather it gave the employer the 
leverage to define and structure the preceding Moments 1 and 2. The configu-
ration grew out of the conceptions of labour disseminated by the British econ-
omy throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but these conceptions 
also reflected those long shared by craftsmen and by entrepreneurs who tended 
to be merchants more than the direct organisers of production.  
All these conceptions confused labour with the product of labour, in other 
words, they ignored Moment 2 (the implementation of work as a productive 
activity). Indeed, they considered the employer’s purchase of labour from the 
workers (Moment 1) as the equivalent of the purchase of labour already incor-
porated in the product (Moment 3). Adam Smith was the first to make this 
“mistake”, or rather to have founded this convention. His error can be forgiven, 
because the industrial establishments he observed in his time were made up of 
groups of craftsmen working with their assistants, who were paid piecework 
rates (cf. the paradigmatic example of pin manufacturing). What the company 
director purchased was in fact the product (e.g. pin heads) and not truly the 
right to dispose of labour-power at his guise. But fundamentally this conven-
tion of interpretation of the employment relation testifies to the major theoreti-
cal invention of the British economy: the market. British economists analysed 
all economic phenomena through the prism of market theory. Smith’s contem-
poraries (such as James Steuart) and those who came after him (such as David 
Ricardo, James Mill and John Stuart Mill) did likewise. They identified labour 
as being directly exchanged as materialised labour. As the contemporary Ger-
man commentator Theodor Bernhardi18 in 1847 noted with surprise, Smith 
analysed the production process as a process of exchange between two owners 
negotiating the purchase of labour, but the labour was already incorporated in a 
                                                             
18  Quoted by Biernacki (1995, 252). 
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product. There was another, deeper source of confusion, however. Under the 
influence of the Poor Laws and the constant debates over their reform, waged 
labour was identified as poor relief. Waged labour was unworthy of a free man. 
Only someone who remunerated himself by bringing the products of his labour 
to market could be considered a free man.  
The comparison of piece-rate schedules in the textile industry in Great Brit-
ain and Germany during the second half of the nineteenth century made by 
Richard Biernacki (1995) tells us a great deal about the British conception of 
labour. The textile industry was an important sector of the both economies (and 
of their competition in international markets). Piecework rates were a key in-
strument enabling employers to achieve a good compromise between produc-
tivity (reducing unit cost) and product quality. The weaver’s task (then and 
now) consisted in ensuring that the loom’s shuttles moved the weft threads 
horizontally back and forth across the vertical threads of the warp. As the shut-
tles laid their thread, a beam rotated to let out more warp. For a given warp (the 
“weave”), the speed of the beam’s rotation largely determined the length of the 
cloth manufactured per hour. If the weave of the fabric was to be loose, the 
weaver could produce more lengths of cloth per hour, but he would have to 
change the warp in the loom more often, which was time-consuming. If the 
weave of the fabric was dense, the loom had to operate more slowly. The 
weaver produced fewer lengths of cloth but he did not have to change the warp 
nearly as often and thus would lose less time.  
Great Britain and Germany found different solutions to the same technical 
problem of how to gauge output. Biernacki studied both systems in depth, 
researching the extremely rich archives produced in textile industry circles 
(Biernacki 1995, 43-57). The schemas used to calculate piece-rates in both 
countries were two-dimensional, but the dimensions they used were different. 
British employers and workers agreed on a system of remuneration linking the 
length of output to the density of the fabric (i.e. the number of weft threads 
inserted per inch). For a standard length of warp, the more weft threads were 
woven into each inch, the higher the pay. This made it possible to offset the 
negative effect of slower loom motion required to produce denser cloth. In 
contrast, German employers and workers agreed on a system centred on the 
number of Schüsse (literally “shots”, the back-and-forth movement of the shut-
tles in a given time). This system linked the payment calculated per thousands 
of Schüsse with the number of shots required to produce one centimetre of 
cloth. Here again, the idea was the same, but the principle used to calculate was 
different. Weavers who produced loose-woven fabric earned more per thousand 
shots than weavers who produced dense fabric. They thus earned more per 
actual hour of work, which offset the time lost in very frequent warp changes 
on the loom.  
What is of interest to us in this example is the fact that, once again, the con-
ventions used to evaluate labour were specific to each country. In Germany, the 
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measurement of labour performance and wage calculation were concentrated in 
Moment 2 (production); the criterion was strictly technical and referred to the 
direct characteristics of the labour activity in the workshop. In Great Britain, 
the measurement of performance and the calculation of wages focused on the 
finished product, ready for market (Moment 3). Despite the changes in tech-
niques and markets, and the familiarity of Britons and Germans with each 
other’s practices, they each kept to their own system and considered it better 
than the other’s.  
Willibald Steinmeier has criticised Biernacki for unduly generalising about 
the whole of Great Britain from observations regarding a single industry 
(Steinmeier 1999, 500-528).19 Steinmeier is right from the standpoint of labour 
practices. It can in fact be shown that a plurality of labour conventions existed 
within the economic fabric in Great Britain as elsewhere, depending on the 
industry and locality. But with regard to the configuration of meaning given to 
labour, research on common law converges with Biernacki’s conclusions. Here 
we reinterpret the work done by Simon Deakin and Franck Wilkinson (2005) 
on the history of British labour law.  
In the interpretation of the contract of service given by common law judges 
in their decisions, workers were subject to two contradictory injunctions: free-
dom of action versus disciplinary control.  
On the one hand, they were held responsible for the fabrication of the prod-
uct and its delivery by the date and according to the specifications provided for 
in the contract. In other terms, they were in charge of the realisation of Moment 
2 (production). Fulfilling this responsibility should imply freedom of action, 
precisely the freedom of the artisan, the master and the craftsman, and that was 
how the workers perceived things. In fact, in large industries, trade unions were 
to continue fighting to maintain customary labour rules that were reformulated 
in a different context to extend the rules of the trade. Using those rules, the 
trade union intended to control hiring (closed shop), maintain the traditional 
occupational hierarchy (job differentiation, demarcation) against any attempt to 
dilute it (hiring unskilled workers) and set wage rates. This control was active 
throughout the period and rather successful: after each of the World Wars, the 
government rewarded worker participation in the war effort, which had led to 
suspending the rules, by passing a law to reinstate them.  
But on the other hand, the value given to this freedom was denied and re-
placed by strict disciplinary control based on legal arrangements outside the 
enterprise (carrying penalties of fines and/or prison sentences). This control 
resulted in focusing court decisions on Moment 3 of the employment relation 
(delivery of the product made). The payment of wages could be deferred until 
the sale of the product, which would testify to its compliance with market 
                                                             
19  Document communicated by Willibald Steinmeier at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sci-
ences Sociales, Seminar “Les mots de l’histoire” held on 14 March 2008. 
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specifications. While the employer was dispensed from giving prior notice 
before dismissing a worker (and from the obligation to pay any wages due), the 
employee had to comply with a period of notice (often as long as several 
weeks) before he could leave. For a long time, voluntary departure meant (and 
this was confirmed by jurisprudence) the employee would not be paid wages 
corresponding to the period of notice.20 This control implied – and herein lies 
the contradiction and the source of the injustice felt by the workers – a hierar-
chical concept with a strong moral dimension. The dependent worker was tied, 
in the strong sense, to the employer; the concept of service had the connotation 
of “being at the service of”, being a servant attached to his master and subject 
to a duty of obedience.  
It is difficult to know how prevalent the remaining traces of the contract of 
service actually were in the interwar period, but the tension was certainly 
strong. Craftsmen shared the conception of nineteenth century economists and 
social reformers that only an independent person who had control over his 
labour and the product of that labour was a free and worthy man, with a right to 
take part in public life.  
3.2 Germany and Freedom of Association 
Beyond the vicissitudes of the First World War, Germany’s defeat and social 
and political conflicts, the advent of the Weimar Republic and its actions were 
in keeping with the imperial tradition. However, they shifted its industrial 
emphasis towards labour. The Constitution of the Weimar Republic, promul-
gated on 11 August, 1919, devoted several articles to labour (in Second Part. 
Section 5. Economic Life). Article 157 stipulates that “labour is under the 
special protection of the Reich”.21 Article 159 is concerned with freedom of 
association22, Article 161 with social insurance and Article 163 with the duty to 
work and to aid unemployed workers. Article 165 stipulates: “Workers and 
employees are called upon to participate, on an equal legal footing in commu-
nity with the employers, in the regulation of wages and working conditions as 
well as in the economic development of productive forces”.23 These ends justi-
                                                             
20  To the point that the Truck Acts (1831, 1887) were passed to require regular payment of 
wages, without all sorts of arbitrary deductions. But they were limited to dependent work-
ers, which excluded subcontractors, outworkers and servants (Deakin and Wilkinson 2005, 
73). 
21  Article 157, § 1: “Die Arbeitskraft steht unter besonderem Schutz des Reichs.” 
22  Article 159 (extract): “Die Vereinigungsfreiheit zur Wahrung und Förderung der Arbeits- 
und Wirtschaftsbedingungen ist für jedermann und für alle Berufe gewährleistet.” 
23  Article 165 (1) “Die Arbeiter und Angestellten sind dazu berufen gleichberechtigt in Ge-
meinschaft mit den Unternehmern an der Regelung der Lohn- und Arbeitsbedingungen so-
wie an der gesamten wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der produktiven Kräfte mitzuwirken. Die 
beiderseitigen Organisationen und ihre Vereinbarungen werden anerkannt.” The English 
version translates Gemeinschaft by cooperation and speaks only of equal footing. Article 
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fied the creation of collective organisations and recognition of their agreements 
by the state. Labour institutions bore the stamp of an objective of social and 
political transformation and henceforth labour became the core issue of politi-
cal controversies and struggles.  
The conventions that gave meaning to the employment relation in Germany 
focused on Moment 2 (the production process and its organisation). Even fur-
ther, Moment 2 was constitutionalised and German society organised around it. 
Moments 1 and 3 were subordinated to it: Moment 1 (hiring, setting wages) 
because it was linked to production needs as a result of collective bargaining, 
following the constitutional requirement of joint participation by trade unions 
and employers; Moment 3 due to the mode of national development itself, 
based on industrialisation and on its salient feature (the rise of quality products 
demanded and organised by the Empire, which was designed to make German 
identity the synonym of excellence throughout the world).  
By assigning priority to the realisation of the product, the configuration of 
meaning of labour in Germany remained in line with the Hegelian tradition (cf. 
Part 1). The conceptualisation of Moment 2 was original, quite different from, 
if not opposed, to the British approach. It was based on the primacy of freedom 
of association over freedom of contract.  
Through the hiring process, the worker put the free use of his labour-power 
(Arbeitskraft) at the disposal of the employer, who in turn was required to use 
this labour-power efficiently thanks to the quality of company organisation. 
The efficient use of labour-power enabled the employer to make a profit and 
the worker to earn his wages. This conception offered a solution to the dilemma 
created by labour conventions: their object. The relevant object structuring the 
employment relation became the exchange of one’s labour-power for wages, an 
exchange pervaded moreover by a concern for efficiency. What is most re-
markable is that it appears that Marx has built his theory of the exploitation of 
labour on this convention. According to Biernacki, however, Marx developed 
his theory while living in exile in Great Britain, without knowledge of the work 
of contemporary German economists. For indeed it can be found in numerous 
forms in the writings of those economists of all political stripes, as well as in 
press publications by trade unions and other sources in Germany. It was ex-
pressed in Article 165 of the Constitution cited above. The legitimacy of equal 
participation of workers and employers was based on a common good: eco-
nomic performance in terms of both quantity and quality.  
This convention in no way ruled out conflict or social struggles, but it 
shaped the way they were expressed. Most of the founders of the Weimar Re-
public, who came from or were close to the SPD and free trade unions, sub-
                                                                                                                                
165 (2) “Die Arbeiter und Angestellten erhalten zur Wahrnehmung ihrer sozialen und wirt-
schaftlichen Interessen gesetzliche Vertretungen in Betriebsarbeiterräten sowie in nach 
Wirtschaftsgebieten gegliederten Bezirksarbeiterräten und in einem Reichsarbeiterrat.” 
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scribed to Marx’s theory of labour exploitation as absolute dependence (with-
out any subsisting individual freedom) of the worker on capital. In their view, 
this was an objective reality, which could be countered in two ways: either by 
using labour law to moderate exploitation or through a gradual struggle to 
reach socialism. Kahn-Freund (1975) recalls that the concepts of labour and 
dependence developed by Hugo Sinzheimer, one of the jurists that instigated 
labour law under Weimar, combined the traditions of Marx and of Gierke. 
Sinzheimer borrowed from Gierke24 the idea of unlimited subordination of the 
worker’s will to the company, which viewed him as nothing but an object or an 
instrument. Outside the organism formed by the company to which he be-
longed, the worker was not a person from an economic point of view; inasmuch 
as his entire existence was determined by a totally alien authority, in whose life 
he played no part whatsoever, he had no civil rights in the economy as a whole. 
But Sinzheimer retained Marx’s idea that labour is made of flesh and blood, 
that it is the expression of a living person. He therefore assigned to labour law 
(or “dependent” labour law as he described it) the role of “moderating the 
employer’s decision-making authority by introducing legal elements”.25 And it 
was up to trade union organisations to ensure the moderation of the employer’s 
authority in practice.  
German trade union leaders concluded they could use newly implemented 
economic co-participation as the starting point for a peaceful path to socialism 
that would put the undeniable productive efficiency of capitalism at the service 
of the working class. Unions therefore played this card, thinking they would be 
protected by parliamentary and economic democracy and their constitutionally 
recognised role within it. Their main if not sole levers for action in this context 
lay in support from the law and active participation in all the bodies in charge 
of labour regulation and administration and social protection. 
The individual worker was powerless in the conception of labour as absolute 
dependence. Freedom of association was his only chance for salvation. As 
Heinz Potthoff said in 1925,  
What is new in [German] labour law after the First World War is that its foun-
dation has shifted from individual rights to collective rights. The labour con-
tract as an individual agreement on working conditions has been relegated 
even further to secondary status. Its content is determined from outside not 
only by law, but above all by collective norms (the collective agreement, 
Tarifvertrag, and the company agreement or Betriebsvereinbarung). Freedom 
of association now stands in place of freedom of contract. 
                                                             
24  Otto von Gierke (J.-D. Lewis 1935). 
25  Kahn-Freund (1975), edited by Lewis and Clark (1981, 79). 
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Priority was given to the norms resulting from collective bargaining.26 Labour 
rules (particularly wages and the wage system, normal working hours and 
overtime, apprenticeship and often workshop rules) were produced and enacted 
through collective agreements. By virtue of Article 159 of the Constitution, 
these rules acquired the force of law for signatories of the agreement, and they 
were expected to use their influence among their members to ensure they were 
properly implemented.  
The conceptualisation of labour under Weimar differed from the British and 
French conceptions in that co-participation prevailed upon contractual free-
dom.27 In the French conception of subordination, freedom of contract created 
social and economic rights that were guaranteed by the state. What the worker 
lost in agreeing to be directed by an employer (and temporarily alienating or 
rather setting aside the exercise of his free will in this process) was recovered 
in the attribution of collective rights. Furthermore, and just as importantly, free 
will remained a possibility that could always be exercised during labour and 
never denied. The employer therefore had no fundamental justification for 
treating the worker like a thing, e.g. pushing technical rationalisation (particu-
larly scientific organisation and standardisation) to the point where the person 
was no longer taken into account. In Great Britain, as we have seen, the justifi-
cation for trade unions was to defend, tooth and nail, customary labour rules. 
The possibility of cooperating with the employer was ruled out and the at-
tempts to create an institutionalised, centralised model of social relationships 
(under the influence of a few major industrialists) failed miserably during the 
interwar period. Incidentally, most employers were convinced from the start 
that such attempts were futile. The resulting configuration of action impeded or 
diverted any collective effort to modernise the economy and in particular to 
rationalise labour. In Germany, on the contrary, everything – including wage 
and social improvements – was to be achieved through better organisation. The 
1920s and 1930s in Germany were marked by a systematic effort, led by nu-
merous, powerful professional associations to promote and implement stan-
dardisation and rationalisation. 
Association was thus the core concept and principle of collective construc-
tion in labour conventions under Weimar. It also appears to have fuelled ten-
sions within the federal organisation into Länder inherited from the Empire. In 
Germany, a person’s identity was tied to his identity at work which was inher-
                                                             
26  The fact that the collective agreement had pre-eminence over the individual contract was 
pointed out by another Weimar jurist, Walter Kaskel, 1932. (Lewis and Clark 1981, p. 32), 
an interpretation shared by Sinzheimer. 
27  Freedom of contract appears Article 152 (1) in connection with economic transactions. It is 
framed (Article 151 (1)) by the idea that “The economy has to be organized based on the 
principles of justice, with the goal of achieving life in dignity for everyone.” In German: 
“Die Ordnung des Wirtschaftslebens muss den Grundsätzen der Gerechtigkeit mit dem Zie-
le der Gewährleistung eines menschenwürdigen Daseins für alle entsprechen.” 
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ently communitarian; it was a form of belonging – we cannot (yet) speak of 
citizenship. Identity at work in the Weimar Republic was a focal point of com-
petition between employers and trade unions. This competition played on the 
ambiguity between labour community (Werkgemeinschaft) and works commu-
nity (Werksgemeinschaft). As a result of this competition, the worker was sub-
ject to a twofold allegiance: to the group (the organisation that negotiated the 
agreement), on the one hand, and to the employer (who controlled the organisa-
tion of work) on the other. The worker could expect support from both: solidar-
ity in the first case, paternalism in the second. This double allegiance had im-
portant implications for the way the employment relation proceeded. It carried 
with it expectations in terms of responsibility and efficiency that weighed upon 
the worker. Consequently, the worker’s salvation – obtaining good wages and 
good working conditions – lay in surrendering to the work organisation, and 
even more in actively participating in collective performance.  
3.3. France and Freedom of Contract 
To put it in a nutshell, we might say labour felt at home in the Republic. De-
spite real inequalities in their living and working conditions, French workers 
(artisans and craftsmen) felt neither dominated nor exploited from an ontologi-
cal point of view. Though their movements were repressed (sometimes fright-
fully, e.g. after the Paris Commune in 1871), over the long term, workers repre-
sented a turbulent social force carrying considerable political weight and they 
were well aware of it. Manual labour was the moral foundation of the Republic 
and they were its spokesmen (Sewell 1986; Sonenscher 1989; Cottereau 1986). 
With the rise of large industrial firms at the turn of the twentieth century, 
workers were faced with a world that was more or less impervious to those 
values. Nevertheless, the understandings of the realities of labour, by those who 
experienced them as well as by economists, jurists and trade union leaders, 
remained, as it were, midway between the British and German conceptions. For 
workers the finality of labour was not perceived to be production for a market 
(in which case labour would merely have a market value incorporated in the 
product) or support for increased output through organisation. Instead, the 
dominant conception was a combination of attachment to concrete labour and 
the social finality of labour (considered as an act performed neither for the 
market nor for the boss but above all for the community), a combination that 
included the civic dimension of labour.  
Thus, the conceptions of labour in nineteenth and early twentieth century 
French political economy were not as fully developed or as clear-cut as those in 
Britain and Germany. What stands out would seem to be a conception of the 
labour transaction as the offer of a capacity to provide services. “When I hire a 
worker, what he sells me is not his stock of skills, but only the services that his 
capacity can provide in one day of work”, wrote Jean-Baptiste Say, who was 
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himself an entrepreneur in the textile industry. While Say and his followers, 
unlike their British counterparts, differentiated between labour sold as a service 
and the product of that labour, they did not go as far as German economists, 
who reduced labour to a force whose output could be maximised through or-
ganisation. They used the terms “labour-power” and “labour services” syn-
onymously, by the way. The ambiguity of these concepts allowed them to 
maintain this intermediate position and implicitly preserved the concrete di-
mension of labour. In this regard, it is important to make a clear distinction 
between the hiring-for-services contract peculiar to French law in this period 
and the British service contract, which had the connotation of master-servant 
relation. Similarly, we should not forget that nineteenth century French social-
ists failed to understand Marx’s work or his conception of capitalism as a 
mechanism for extracting a surplus value from labour. Of course they accepted 
the idea that employers purchased labour activity, but in their view, the exploi-
tation of this activity occurred in the labour market, hence their hostility to 
illegal subcontracting of labour (“marchandage”), frequent in that period. 
Biernacki provides striking testimony to French theoretical and practical 
troubles in his example of weavers and piecework wage schedules discussed 
earlier with regard to Great Britain and Germany (Biernacki 1995, 337-343). 
After mechanised production was introduced during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, French manufacturers used both the “German” type (pay-
ment by the number of times the shuttle shot across the warp in a given period 
of time) and the “British” type (payment by the length of cloth delivered). But 
the French payment systems, unlike the German and British systems, failed to 
produce a linear relationship between the amount of wages paid and the 
worker’s performance. This is a sign that the abstract concept of labour (i.e. 
reduced to time and quantity), already in use in Britain and Germany, had not 
yet penetrated French industrial practices. Moreover, French employers and 
workers viewed payment systems merely as references to be used in wage 
negotiations and not as an objective standard to be adopted. The references 
could be adjusted however one wished; the point was to arrive at a common 
estimate of daily wages. As the Lille employers said in 1909: “the system is 
nothing, the wages are everything”. 
In keeping with the Civil Code tradition, French labour law viewed the im-
plementation of labour (Moment 2 of the employment relation) as a free 
agreement between the parties and therefore had no role to play in it. On the 
other hand, the Code gradually legislated with regard to Moment 1 (entering 
into the employment relation) and Moment 3 (from the angle of a breach or 
possible suspension of that relation), to ensure some degree of equality between 
the rights of the parties. It tried to offset the inequality of the respective posi-
tions of the worker and the employer, in particular by structuring the employ-
ment relation around the principle of subordination. The aim – and this is an 
essential point of the comparison – was not to confirm the fact that workers 
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were subordinate to the authority of their company head and duty-bound to 
obey him, but rather to derive rights from the acknowledgement of their subor-
dination. The employer’s responsibility was clearly limited to the scope of the 
company. It was gradually framed by the rules of what we might nowadays 
refer to as the “social public order”, which at the time were called “législation 
ouvrière”, notably in the area of working conditions (working hours, accidents, 
female and child labour). The French parliament and the state intervened di-
rectly in these areas through public debate and lawmaking. Worker legislation 
did not take a position as such with regard to a normative conception of Mo-
ment 2 (production) of the employment relation. Instead, it required that all 
labour implementation, regardless of the form it took, had to comply with 
minimal conditions. 
The development of labour disputes throughout the period revealed three 
French specificities: it posited a conflict between collective autonomy (from 
which the collective agreement emanated) and workshop rules; labour conven-
tions were inserted into legal texts drafted by judges (which thereby gave them 
the role of evaluating, as well as publicising and legitimising labour conven-
tions, especially the local judges); the legal concept of “group” was used to 
grasp the existence of a collective entity in a legal system that recognised only 
individual wills.28  
The concept of “group” was an important invention. At the time, in French 
law, like British common law but unlike German law, groups were not con-
ceived as substantial entities. They had no existence as such and therefore 
could not make decisions or sign agreements on their own behalf. In other 
words, to be legitimate and entitled to enter into a legally valid agreement, a 
group (a trade union or any group that signed an agreement) had to prove it had 
received the agreement of its members. This requirement led to the use of mul-
tiple techniques such as stipulating for others, mandating representatives or 
holding special group deliberations. For example, when the mandate technique 
was employed, the trade union or group had to receive a mandate from each 
member. These members were the only ones who were covered by the agree-
ment and who were allowed a certain period of time to withdraw from it. It was 
not until 1936 that the Ministry of Labour introduced compulsory procedures to 
extend collective agreements to all workers and all firms.  
The comparison with the German and British conceptions shows that the 
1919 French law pertaining to collective labour agreements (neither a constitu-
tionalised system nor a voluntary system) rewrote and transferred – this time to 
the national level – the compromise between political democracy and social 
democracy already29 to some extent operative at the local level (e.g. in fabri-
                                                             
28  The following discussion is based primarily on the research of Claude Didry (1992, 2001, 
2002). The interpretation is mine. 
29  A compromise sometimes combined with a touch of patronage. 
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ques collectives, to use the term employed, which were local networks centred 
around a particular type of product and composed of workers with different 
statuses ranging from home workers to independent workers, artisans and small 
firms). This new compromise germinating at the time was to leave a mark on 
social practice in France that is still perceptible today. On the one hand, in 
order to sign an agreement, organisations (particularly trade unions) had to 
produce proof of their democratic legitimacy, in other words, demonstrate that 
they indeed represented the persons on whose behalf they claimed to be sign-
ing. In return, through a democratic requirement out of any contest, the law 
recognised a legitimate space of autonomous collective action. Indeed, the 
selected notion of “group” made other types of agreements legally binding, 
particularly those signed by groups following strike reconciliation deals. In 
other words, the strike organisers or workers’ assembly that negotiated an 
agreement henceforth possessed democratic legitimacy, for the movement that 
gave rise to them was considered proof that the temporary group had the sup-
port of the workers. Thus the authority to seek a collective agreement was not 
the exclusive privilege of trade unions, as in Germany or Great Britain. It was 
also a prerogative of the collective movement that developed freely and 
autonomously through a strike. Hence what gave a collective agreement in 
France its force and legitimacy was not the power of the organisation (the trade 
union) that signed it, but the power of the social movement that led to the 
agreement.30 These political conventions (collective autonomy and its legiti-
macy in the democratic order) were to prove important resources for the social 
and political movement during the crisis in the 1930s and the advent of the 
Popular Front in France. 
Conclusion 
The meaning of labour and its configuration of conventions and institutions 
display strong national features. To be able to form a solid conjecture, it would 
be necessary to study how these configurations of meaning have been read-
justed and perhaps substantially changed since the pre-war period and to what 
extent they have converged under the influence of the creation of the European 
Community. Nevertheless, the results provide sufficient grounds for question-
ing the nature of the European Union. According to Milward (1992), the found-
ing nations of post-war Europe conceived it as an extension of themselves 
(especially as a market wide enough to lead to growth of their productive appa-
ratus), rather than as a new object. Given the singularity of national configura-
tions of meaning, what kind of political agreement underlay this type of con-
                                                             
30  As a result, even today, the rate of trade union membership in France does not tell us much 
about the potential for employees’ mobilisation. 
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struction? Would it have generated over time Europe-wide conventions capable 
of becoming the foundation for real expectations and mutual understanding? Or 
did the founding countries merely play a rational game of pretending to agree, 
and end up convinced – at least at some level – by the gradual construction of 
European legislation and policies that there actually was an agreement? If that 
was the case, the last three years have been a rude awakening (Supiot 2011). 
In the economics of convention, the researcher tries to see through the ac-
tors’ eyes and experience action along with them in order to grasp the conven-
tions. This approach is particularly relevant for history. Let us take just one 
example. What sense does it make to construct long, quantitative series, which 
implicitly claims that the statistical conventions used for defining and measur-
ing are a-historical? The data that is produced is not worthless, but the external 
(and contemporary) model of analysis that supports data must be confronted 
with how actors understood the same phenomenon at the time. In an interna-
tional comparison, reducing qualitative singularities to quantitative differences 
leads to “kill” any possibility of access to the national specificities of meaning 
and to their very dynamics.  
The symmetrical risk is to pay exclusive attention to actors’ justifications 
and disputes. One runs the risk of missing a whole side of the historical pro-
cess, the one that actors forget and in a sense have to take for granted in order 
to act; namely, the significations incorporated in the surrounding social objects 
which populate the situation of action and coordination and direct (or at least 
frame) the actions and understandings of the situation. What hermeneutics can 
contribute to the economics of convention and specifically to convention-based 
history would be to reintroduce those objects into the analysis, along with and 
in relation to the actors’ justifications, but not as part of an exterior, determin-
ing structure. Accumulations and rearrangements of conventions result in con-
figurations of meaning. By the very fact of being subject to rearrangement and 
interpretation, the environment of social objects, on which configurations of 
meaning rely, frames the coordination as well as is taking part in and resulting 
from the historical dynamic.  
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